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Wood: Workmen's Compensation

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I.

EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY RmERMENT oN
UIMPLOYMENT COPENSATION

Ernest C. Richey was employed by the Riegel Textile Corporation for approximately fifty-five years. His job placed him
in the category of "salaried personnel," which made him eligible
to participate in a retirement annuity plan instituted by his
employer in 1945. This plan was entirely voluntary and had
as one of its provisions an agreement that employees within the
program would retire at age sixty-five. Richey did not join the
plan until 1955; he gave as a reason for his belated entrance
"that he understood from an official of the company that the
mandatory retirement feature had been eliminated."1 Richey was
initially furnished with an information booklet expressly setting
forth the retirement feature, and he was later given annual
statements showing his total contributions and his "normal
retirement date" as June 1, 1965. He was duly retired over his
protest and was denied unemployment compensation by the
Employment Security Commission because of a finding that he
had "voluntarily retired." The trial court affirmed the commission's decision. 2

The issue on appeal was one of voluntariness. Evidence indicated that the terms of the annuity plan were explained to
the employee at the time of payroll deduction authorizationthat is, with the privilege to draw a pension goes the contractual
obligation to retire at sixty-five when the pension is due. The
plaintiff was in a supervisory capacity, and his length of service
gave evidence that he was familiar with the fact that program
participants retired at age sixty-five.
The Employment Security Law was designed to provide
stability when industrial employment becomes unstable, and
available reserves are "to be used for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own." 3 The Richey court
1. Richey v. Riegel Textile Corp., 253 S.C. 59, 62, 169 S.E2d 101, 103
(1969).
2.Factual issues and findings of the Commission are binding on appeal if
supported by any evidence. See Hyman v. South Carolina Employment
Security Comm'n, 234 S.C. 369, 108 S.E.2d 554 (1959); Johnson v. Pratt,
200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865 (1942).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-38 (1962).
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unanimously held, therefore, that "voluntary retirement" 4 includes a worker who by "his own choice, elects to leave his
employment under a retirement annuity plan upon reaching a
specified age. In such case, the employee voluntarily terminates
his employment." 5 The court further held that the effect on
unemployment compensation was without the contemplation of
the parties when they agreed to the retirement plan.
II.

IwjuRY BY AccreNT

In Riley v. State Ports Authority the plaintiff's intestate
suffered a brain hemorrhage because of fits of coughing which
caused increased blood pressure. The deceased, who had a preexisting malady of asthma, had been exposed to a dust-laden
atmosphere during duty hours with the State Ports Authority.
The trial court affirmed an award of benefits by the Industrial
Commission, and the Ports Authority and the State Workmen's
Compensation Fund appealed.
Citing Hiers v. Brunson,7 the supreme court held unanimously that there was "injury by accident" within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act," because the trauma came
about by "chance or without design, taking place unexpectedly
or unintentionally." 9 Death by natural causes does not come
within the meaning of the Act; but, if a pre-existing malady is
shown to have been accelerated or increased by some act or event
of chance, the accidental nature of the injury is established. In
Riley's case the court found a causal connection between the
employee's work (unloading clay bags and sporadically sweeping up) and "his death, such being an accident which arose out
of and in the course of his employment."' 0
III. DISFIGUREMENT

In Smith v. Daniel Construction Co." the court was asked to
define the term, disfigurement. 12 The appellant, Smith, was
4. One who "voluntarily retires" is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(6) (1962).
5. 253 S.C. 59, 65, 169 S.E2d 101, 104 (1969).
6. 253 S.C. 621, 172 S.E2d 657 (1970).
7. 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E2d 211 (1952).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-14 (1962).
9. 253 S.C. 621, 625, 172 S.E2d 657, 659 (1970), quoting from Hiers v.
Brunson, 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E2d 211 (1952).
10. 253 S.C. 621, 627, 172 S.E2d 657, 660 (1970).
11. 253 S.C. 248, 169 S.E.2d 767 (1969).
12. In case of serious facial, head or bodily disfigurement, the Commission shall award proper and equitable compensation not to
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injured while in the employment of Daniel. The injury necessitated the removal of his spleen, which left an abdominal scar.
The Industrial Commission awarded $300 for the scar and
$2,000 for the loss of the spleen as an organ of the body.13 On
appeal the majority affirmed the trial court's decision to strike
the award for the loss of his "organ."
Prior to the 1941 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation
Act which was construed in Smith, the court in Manning '.
Gossett Mills14 held that the loss of a testicle was not serious
bodily disfigurement. Additionally, in the case of Bowen v.
Ohiuola Mfg. Co.'s (decided after the enactment of the questioned amendment), the court stated that in pre-1941 cases, except
for disfigurement to the face or the head, proof of reduced
earning capacity was required before compensation was allowed.
These pre-1941 interpretations largely prompted the enactment
of the questioned amendment to section 72-153 of the South
Carolina Code of Laws. The amendment added the following:
Disfigurement shall also include the loss or serious or
permanent injury of any member or organ of the body
for which no compensation is payable under the schedule of specific injuries set out in this section. And in
cases of bodily disfigurement it shall not be necessary
for the employee to prove that the disfigurement handicaps him in retaining or procuring employment or that
it interferes with his earning capacity.' 6
The Smith court held that the effect of the 1941 amendment
was to raise a presumption of reduction in earning capacity for
all serious bodily disfigurements, but that it did not "either
expressly or by reasonable inference extend the scope of 'serious
bodily disfigurement' to nondisfiguring loss or injury to [previously non-scheduled] members."1 7 Thus, the court reiterated
exceed two thousand five hundred dollars. Disfigurement shall
also include the loss or serious or permanent injury of any member
or organ of the body for which no compensation is payable under
the schedule of specific injuries set out in this section. And

in cases of bodily disfigurement it shall not be necessary fort the
employee to prove that disfigurement handicaps him in retaining
or procuring employment or that it interferes with his earning
capacity.
253 S.C. 248, 256, 169 S.E2d 767, 771 (1969), citing S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72153 (1962) (emphasis added by Bussey, A. J.).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-153 (1962) also limits recovery for disfigurement
to $2,500 total.
14. 192 S.C. 262, 6 S.E.2d 256 (1939).
15. 238 S.C. 322, 120 S.E.2d 99 (1961).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-153 (1962) (emphasis added).
17. 253 S.C. 248, 252, 169 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1969).
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the pre-1941 position that a disfigurement must disfigure-a
scar is a disfigurement, but the loss of the spleen behind the scar
is not a disfigurement.
Justice Bussey dissented and questioned such an interpretation
of the amendment, since the amendment purported to cover
situations such as in the Manning case, by pronouncing that a
"disfigurement shall also include the loss ... of an organ [not
previously within the schedule of specific injuries] .... -"18 The
Bowen court indicated that there must be a disfigurement in
the general sense of the word. The dissent urged that to continue Bowen's interpretation of the 1941 amendment would be
palpable error and cited several cases containing precedent for
the striking of erroneous opinions. 19 The dissent further argued
that Bowen gave a different interpretation to the 1941 amendment than other opinions of the court. These opinions, according
to Justice Bussey, clearly show the true and correct interpretation
of legislative intent: loss of an organ is a "disfigurement." For example, a unanimous court in Cagle v. Clinton Cotton
2
Milsl
interpreted the loss of six teeth as squarely within the
provisions of the 1941 amendment even though there was no
"apparent disfigurement."
We can reach no other conclusion than that it was the
intendment of the legislature to enlarge the coverage
provided by the Act declaring the loss or serious or
permanent injury of any member or organ of the body
for which no provision is made under the schedule of
specific injuries, a disfigurement as a matter of law....
It is not necessary that the loss or serious or permanent
injury to the organ impair the appearance of the olai22
mant.
18. 253 S.C. 248, 257, 169 S.E.2d 767, 772 (1969).
text of S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-153 (1962).

See note 12 supra for

19. "That doctrine [of stare decisis] has no application, where there is
conflict in the decisions of the court." Daughty v. Northwestern Ry., 92 S.C.
361, 75 S.E. 553 (1912). This proposition was reiterated in Coleman v.

Page's Estate, 202 S.C. 486, 25 S.E.2d 559 (1943).
20. "By the first amendment there was simply added unscheduled members
and organs of the body to the scheduled members of Section 31 as subjects for

an award for bodily disfigurement apparently having as its genesis the opinion

of this court in Manning v. Gosset Mills .

. . ."

Montgomery v. York Mills

Inc., 204 S.C. 469, 30 S.E2d 68 (1944). See also Ingle v. Dunean Mills, 204

S.C. 505, 30 S.E.2d 301 (1944) and the dissent in Parrot v. Barfield Used
Parts, 206 S.C. 381, 34 S.E.2d 802 (1945).
21. 216 S.C. 93, 56 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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Webster's23 specifically defines the spleen as an organ. In
addition, the medical reference work utilized at the Medical
College of South Carolina provides the following definition: a
spleen is "[a] large gland-like but ductless organ situated in
the upper part of the abdominal cavity 2 4on the left side and
lateral to the cardiac end of the stomach."
In spite of the foregoing definitions, one could speculate
that in South Carolina, the spleen, as a result of the Smith case,
is not an organ within the meaning of section 72-153. The
Bowen case, on which the court relied heavily, aptly held that
two invertebral discs did not qualify as an organ. There, also,
the award was split, even though there was just one injury. But
the Bowen case can be distinguished, since the disqualified portion was not an organ of the body. In Smith, where the questioned portion for which an award is sought does qualify as an
organ, Justice Bussey found no reason not to allow the splitting
of compensation between loss of the organ and the scar, where
both arose out of one injury, and the total of the two is within
the $2,500 statutory limitation of award.
The dissent makes a strong case for allowing recovery. The
question remains unsettled- Is the loss of an "organ" a disfigurement?

IV.

EXPEnIENCE ACCOUNT

-

EFFECT oF AYTR-STRIE BNEFrrs

Twenty typesetters struck the State-Record Publishing Co.
Instead of laying off the 300 non-strikers, State-Record chose to
hire replacement typesetters. When the strike ended, the typesetters sought and were refused their old jobs. They applied
for unemployment compensation, and the South Carolina Employment Security Commission sought to charge State-Record's
experience rating account for the benefits subsequently paid to
the applicants. State-Record appealed to the circuit court. In
State-Record Publishing Co. 'v. South Carolina Employment
Security Commission,25 the supreme court affirmed the lower
court's decision in favor of State-Record.
An employer's contribution to the unemployment reserve is
based upon his experience with the unemployment of former
employees. 26 The court stated:
23. WEnSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2200 (3d
24. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1284

ed. 1961).
(23d ed. 1958)

(emphasis added).

25. 254 S.C 1 173 S.E.2d 144 (1970).
26. See S.C. oDE ANN. § 68-174 (1962).
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[Tihe rate of contribution (somewhat equivalent to an
insurance premium) is raised or lowered periodically,
based on the individual employer's experience ....
Obviously, if benefits are paid the twenty employees
involved in this case, the contribution rate will be adversely affected, though it is impossible to estimate to
27
what extent.
There was no question as to benefits accruing to the employees
during their strike: section 68-114 (4) specifically denies benefits
while on strike.2 8 However, the question did evolve: should the
employer's experience factor be charged for the after-stri7e
benefits, or should the benefits be charged to the general -fund
for aU industries to bear?
The court refused to go into the merits of the strike and limited
its opinion to an interpretation of section 68-115, 29 which provides for not charging the employer's experience factor where an
employee voluntarily leaves "without good cause." The court
looked to the intent of the legislature to determine if StateRecord should be charged. The court found that the legislature
sought to encourage employers to provide more stable employment and intended for the "reserves to be used for the benefit
of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."30 The
court inferred that the public good and general welfare intended
to be promoted by the statute, would not have been served had
State-Record laid off 300 non-strikers as a result of the strike
by 20. Abruptly, the court decided that under the circumstances,
the employer should not be penalized for its actions, since it was
faced with a dilemma from which it extricated itself and, at
the same time, kept within the intendment of the Employment
Security Act.3 1
The court's opinion effectively says that one who strikes is
one who voluntarily leaves "without good cause" within the
meaning of section 68-115. Such an interpretation is strengthened
27. 254 S.C. at 5, 173 S.E2d at 145.
28. "Any insured worker shall be ineligible for benefits ... (4) for any
week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial

unemployment is directly due to a labor dispute in active progress in the
factory, establishment or other premises at which he was last employed ......
S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(4) (1962).

29. "Benefits paid to any claimant shall not be charged against the account
tarily left his most recent employment with the employer without good cause
... .. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 68-115 (1962).
30. 254 S.C. at 8, 173 S.E.2d at 147.
31. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 68-1 et seq. (1962).

of any employer when the Commission finds that such individual (a) volun-
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by the court stating that "[s]ection 68-114 and section 68-115 are
mutually exclusive; " 32 that is, "'[w]ithout good cause' referred
to in Section 68-115 does not contemplate fault in the sense of
blame." 33 However, the brief dissent asserted that a lawful strike
called by a member's union was good cause. 34 Employers may
now look to this case as precedent to avoid an adverse effect on
their experience factor by payment of after-strike benefits if
they fall within the State-Record circumstances.
V.

EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

The unanimous decision in Tharpe v. G.E. Moore Co.35 emphasized that the test for ascertaining whether a person is an independent contractor or not is determined by who had the "(1)
right to exercise control [over work], (2) [control] of payment,
(3) [responsibility for] furnishing of equipment and (4) right
to fire."3 6
The claimant's intestate, a contractor on other jobs for the
defendant, subcontracted to install the plumbing at Clinton
Cotton Mills on a cost plus 10% basis.3 7 Total cost was not to
exceed $1,500. Additionally, Tharpe was to receive $165 weekly
over and above the cost plus fixed fee, this amount to be paid at
the completion of work. But this also had to come within the
$1,500 limitation. Therefore, Tharpe could have received nothing
for his own labor if the cost plus fixed fee equaled to or exceeded
$1,500.
The court pointed out that at no time did Moore seek to
control the day-to-day operation of the work or seek to exercise
the power to hire and fire Tharpe employees. Tharpe was entitled to charge customary rental for his equipment as part of
his cost. Payment for the installation of the plumbing would
occur upon completion of the work. The court found that the
claimant did not carry her burden of proof on the four critical
points. When Moore testified that he would not have paid an
excess rate to one of Tharpe's employees or that he would have
terminated the contract had Tharpe been drunk or not per32. 254 S.C. at 9, 173 S.E2d at 147.
33. Id. at 7, 173 S.E.2d at 146.
34. Id. at 9, 173 S.E.2d at 147 (dissenting
35. 174 S.E.2d 397 (S.C. 1970).

opinion).

36. Id. See also South Carolina Indus. Comm'n v. Progressive Life Ins.

Co., 242 S.C. 547, 550, 131 S.E2d 694, 695 (1963); 1A

LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COmPENSATioN § 44.30 at 653 (1967).
37. Moore contended 8%. 174 S.E.2d 397, 399 (S.C. 1970).
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forming in a workmanlike manner, these factors only indicated
Tharpe's status as an independent contractor with the duty to
perform under an implied covenant of good faith,38 and perform
in a workmanlike manner.39 It is clear that in South Carolina
a person's status as employee v. independent contractor will be

determined by direct evidence on the four managerial points of
control.
WmwAx

McB.

WOOD

38. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, 247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d

481 (1966).
39. 17 Am. JuR. 2D Contracts § 371 (1964).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/15

8

Wood: Workmen's Compensation

I

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

